LOCAL BENEFIT-SEEKING IN THE LEGISLATURE: AN INVESTIGATION OF CONGRESSIONAL STAFFING DECISIONS
In prior work, I proposed a prisoner's dilemma theory for the partisan pattern that political ticket splitting has taken in the United States: where Republicans, since 1932, have done consistently better in races for the White House than in contests for Congressional seats. The theory relies on the key assumption that Democratic legislative representatives are more willing to engage in local benefit-seeking. By examining the personal staffing decisions made by members of the House this paper provides some empirical support for such an assumption. Relative to their Republican counterparts, Democratic legislators both hire more personal staff and allocate a higher percentage of the staff hired to district rather than Washington offices. Copyright 1991 Blackwell Publishers Ltd..
Year of publication: |
1991
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Authors: | Zupan, Mark A. |
Published in: |
Economics and Politics. - Wiley Blackwell. - Vol. 3.1991, 2, p. 163-176
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Publisher: |
Wiley Blackwell |
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