Local Spillovers, Convexity and the Strategic Substitutes Property in Networks
We provide existence results in a game with local spillovers where the payoff function satisfies both convexity and the strategic substitutes property. We show that there always exists a stable pairwise network in this game, and provide a condition which ensures the existence of pairwise equilibrium networks. Moreover, our existence proof allows us to characterize a pairwise equilibrium of these networks.
Authors: | Sarangi, Sudipta ; Billand, Pascal ; Bravard, Christophe |
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Institutions: | Department of Economics, Ourso College of Business |
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