Lohnfortzahlung und Krankenstand

Sickness benefit ineome reduces an employee's opportunity costs of absence from work. In the Federal Republic of Germany the institutional arrangement was changed several times during the 1951-1998 period. This paper investigates the effects on sick leave behavior. According to the empirical analysis, moral hazard is a serious problem in Germany. The paper discusses some institutional changes which would significantly reduce moral hazard.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	1999
Authors:	Boss, Alfred
Publisher:	Kiel : Kiel Institute of World Economics (IfW)
Subject:	Lohnfortzahlung \| Erwerbsunfähigkeit \| Fehlzeit \| Moral Hazard \| Private Krankenversicherung \| Deutschland

freely available

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Series:	Kiel Working Paper ; 935
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	German
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/2284 [Handle] RePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:935 [RePEc]
Classification:	I18 - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health ; I38 - Government Policy; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010265443