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Long Cheap Talk

With cheap talk, more can be achieved by long conversations than by a single message-even when one side is strictly better informed than the other. ("Cheap talk" means plain conversation-unmediated, nonbinding, and payoff-irrelevant.) This work characterizes the equilibrium payoffs for all two-person games in which one side is better informed than the other and cheap talk is permitted. Copyright The Econometric Society 2003.
Year of publication:
2003
Authors: Aumann, Robert J. ; Hart, Sergiu
Published in:
Econometrica. - Econometric Society. - Vol. 71.2003, 6, p. 1619-1660
Publisher: Econometric Society
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Type of publication: Article
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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005702435
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