LONG-TERM AND SHORT-TERM CONTRACT IN A MIXED MARKET *
With a two-period mixed oligopolistic framework, this paper analyses the interaction between the length of incentive contracts and market behaviour. Assuming an environment in which firms choose either a long-term or short-term contract, we examine how contracts differ between public and private firms. The results show that the contracts would differ completely among firms; public firm prefers to make a short-term contract while private firm makes a long-term contract. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd/University of Adelaide and Flinders University 2005..
Year of publication: |
2005
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Authors: | NISHIMORI, AKIRA ; OGAWA, HIKARU |
Published in: |
Australian Economic Papers. - Wiley Blackwell. - Vol. 44.2005, 3, p. 275-289
|
Publisher: |
Wiley Blackwell |
Saved in:
freely available
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