Long-Term Care and Family Bargaining
We present a structural model of how families decide who should care for elderly parents. We use data from the National Long-Term Care Survey to estimate and test the parameters of the model. Then we use the parameter estimates to simulate the effects of the existing long-term trends in terms of the common but untested explanations for them. Finally, we simulate the effects of alternative family bargaining rules on individual utility to measure the sensitivity of our results to the family decision-making assumptions we make. Copyright 2002 by the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Resarch Association
Year of publication: |
2002
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Authors: | Engers, Maxim ; Stern, Steven |
Published in: |
International Economic Review. - Department of Economics. - Vol. 43.2002, 1, p. 73-114
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Publisher: |
Department of Economics |
Saved in:
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