Lorenz undominated allocations for TU-games: The weighted Coalitional Lorenz Solutions
In this paper we introduce and study the w-Coalitional Lorenz Solutions to identify the similarities and differences between the prenucleolus and the Shapley value. The similarity is that they both use egalitarian criteria over coalitions. The two main differences are: the prenucleolus and the Shapley value use different egalitarian criteria, and they weight the coalitions differently when applying the criteria. <!--ID="" w-CoLoS or just CoLoS for short.-->
Year of publication: |
2002-10-09
|
---|---|
Authors: | Feltkamp, V. ; Arin, Javier |
Published in: |
Social Choice and Welfare. - Springer. - Vol. 19.2002, 4, p. 869-884
|
Publisher: |
Springer |
Saved in:
freely available
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Lorenz undominated allocations for TU-games : the weighted coalitional Lorenz solutions
Arin, Javier, (2002)
-
Lorenz undominated allocations for TU-games: The weighted Coalitional Lorenz Solutions
Arin, Javier, (2002)
-
Coalitional games with veto players: Myopic and rational behavior
Arin, J., (2012)
- More ...