Losers of CEO tournaments : incentives, turnover, and career outcomes
Year of publication: |
2022
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Authors: | Chan, Eric W. ; Evans, John Harry ; Hong, Duanping |
Published in: |
The accounting review : a publication of the American Accounting Association. - Sarasota, Fla. : American Accounting Association, ISSN 0001-4826, ZDB-ID 210224-9. - Vol. 97.2022, 6, p. 123-148
|
Subject: | promotion | tournament | executive compensation | executive turnover | Führungskräfte | Managers | Erwerbsverlauf | Occupational attainment | Arbeitsmobilität | Labour mobility | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Karriereplanung | Career development | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Lohn | Wages | Wettbewerb | Competition | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsmotivation | Work motivation |
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