Lottery versus All-Pay Auction Contests – A Revenue Dominance Theorem
Year of publication: |
2012
|
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Authors: | Franke, Jörg ; Kanzow, Christian ; Leininger, Wolfgang ; Schwartz, Alexandra |
Publisher: |
Essen : Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI) |
Subject: | All-pay auction | lottery contest | bias | revenue |
Series: | Ruhr Economic Papers ; 315 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
ISBN: | 978-3-86788-361-0 |
Other identifiers: | 10.4419/86788361 [DOI] 722218079 [GVK] hdl:10419/61372 [Handle] RePEc:zbw:rwirep:315 [RePEc] |
Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior |
Source: |
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Lottery versus All-Pay Auction Contests – A Revenue Dominance Theorem
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