Low quality as a signal of high quality
Year of publication: |
2011
|
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Authors: | Clements, Matthew T. |
Published in: |
Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal. - Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW), ISSN 1864-6042. - Vol. 5.2011, 2011-5, p. 1-22
|
Publisher: |
Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW) |
Subject: | Signaling | quality |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Type of publication: | Article |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2011-5 [DOI] |
Classification: | D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; L15 - Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility |
Source: |
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Low quality as a signal of high quality
Clements, Matthew T., (2010)
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Low quality as a signal of high quality
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Low quality as a signal of high quality
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