Lyapunov stability in an evolutionary game theory model of the labour market

In this paper the existence and stability of equilibriums in an evolutionary game theory model of the labour market is studied by using the Lyapunov method. The model displays multiple equilibriums and it is shown that the Nash equilibriums of the static game are evolutionary stable equilibrium in the game theory evolutionary set up. A complete characterization of the dynamics of an evolutionary model of the labour market is provided.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Araujo, Ricardo Azevedo ; Moreira, Helmar Nunes
Published in:	EconomiA. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 1517-7580. - Vol. 15.2014, 1, p. 41-53
Publisher:	Amsterdam : Elsevier
Subject:	Evolutionary game theory approach \| Labour market \| Informal economy \| Lyapunov function

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Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Article
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.1016/j.econ.2014.03.006 [DOI] 102536516X [GVK] hdl:10419/179562 [Handle] RePEc:anp:econom:v:15:y:2014:i:1:41_53 [RePEc]
Classification:	E26 - Informal Economy; Underground Economy ; J62 - Occupational and Intergenerational Mobility ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011858403