Lying and deception in games
Year of publication: |
2020
|
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Authors: | Sobel, Joel |
Published in: |
Journal of political economy. - Chicago, Ill. : Univ. Press, ISSN 0022-3808, ZDB-ID 3026-0. - Vol. 128.2020, 3, p. 907-947
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Subject: | lying | deception | behavioral economics | Kommunikation | Communication | Definition | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Verhaltensökonomik | Behavioral economics | Theorie | Theory |
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