Lying and Team Incentives

We investigate the influence of two widespread compensation schemes, individual piece-rates and team incentives, on participants' inclination to lie, by adapting the experimental setup of Fischbacher and Heusi (2008). Lying turns out to be more pronounced under team incentives than under individual piece-rates, which highlights a so far fairly neglected feature of these compensation schemes.

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Year of publication:	2011-09
Authors:	Conrads, Julian ; Irlenbusch, Bernd ; Rilke, Rainer Michael ; Walkowitz, Gari
Institutions:	Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Subject:	compensation schemes \| lying \| team \| experiment

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	IZA Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Number 5968 10 pages
Classification:	C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior ; C92 - Laboratory; Group Behavior ; M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects (stock options, fringe benefits, incentives, family support programs)
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009294841