Lying and team incentives

Julian Conrads; Bernd Irlenbusch; Rainer Michael Rilke; Gari Walkowitz

We investigate the influence of two widespread compensation schemes, individual piece-rates and team incentives, on participants' inclination to lie, by adapting the experimental setup of Fischbacher and Heusi (2008). Lying turns out to be more pronounced under team incentives than under individual piece-rates, which highlights a so far fairly neglected feature of these compensation schemes. -- compensation schemes ; lying ; team ; experiment

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Conrads, Julian ; Irlenbusch, Bernd ; Rilke, Rainer Michael ; Walkowitz, Gari
Publisher:	Bonn : IZA
Subject:	Arbeitsgruppe \| Team \| Vergütungssystem \| Compensation system \| Anreiz \| Incentives \| Kommunikation \| Communication \| Experiment

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Extent:	Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 8 S., 328,30 KB) graph. Darst.
Series:	Discussion paper series / IZA. - Bonn : IZA, ZDB-ID 2120053-1. - Vol. 5968
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzung: Acrobat Reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/55082 [Handle]
Classification:	C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior ; C92 - Laboratory; Group Behavior ; M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects (stock options, fringe benefits, incentives, family support programs)
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009408697