Lying for strategic advantage : rational and boundedly rational misrepresentation of intentions
Year of publication: |
2003
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Authors: | Crawford, Vincent P. |
Published in: |
The American economic review. - Nashville, Tenn. : American Economic Assoc., ISSN 0002-8282, ZDB-ID 203590-X. - Vol. 93.2003, 1, p. 133-149
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Subject: | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Konflikt | Conflict | Rationalität | Rationality | Begrenzte Rationalität | Bounded rationality | Theorie | Theory |
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