Mécanismes de discipline collective des dirigeants vs. mécanismes de réputation : une application au keiretsu financier japonais.
Year of publication: |
2005-04
|
---|---|
Authors: | Soulat, Laurent |
Institutions: | Maison des Sciences Économiques, Université Paris 1 (Panthéon-Sorbonne) |
Subject: | Incentive theory | corporate governance | reputation and control mechanisms | Japanese keiretsu |
Extent: | application/pdf |
---|---|
Series: | Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques. - ISSN 1624-0340. |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | 60 pages |
Classification: | D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; G32 - Financing Policy; Capital and Ownership Structure ; L14 - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks ; L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure: Markets vs. Hierarchies; Vertical Integration |
Source: |
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