Maintaining a Reputation When Strategies Are Imperfectly Observed.
This paper studies reputation effects in games with a single long-run player whose choice of stage-game strategy is imperfectly observed by his opponents. The authors obtain lower and upper bounds on the long-run player's payoff in any Nash equilibrium of the game. If the long-run player's stage-game strategy is statistically identified by the observed outcomes, then, for generic payoffs, the upper and lower bounds both converge, as the discount factor tends to one, to the long-run player's Stackelberg payoff, which is the most he could obtain by publicly committing himself to any strategy. Copyright 1992 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.
Year of publication: |
1992
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Authors: | Fudenberg, Drew ; Levine, David K |
Published in: |
Review of Economic Studies. - Wiley Blackwell, ISSN 0034-6527. - Vol. 59.1992, 3, p. 561-79
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Publisher: |
Wiley Blackwell |
Saved in:
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