Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed.
Year of publication: |
1991
|
---|---|
Authors: | Fudenberg, D. |
Institutions: | Economics Department, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) |
Subject: | game theory | economic models | economic equilibrium |
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