Majority voting with stochastic preferences : The whims of a committee are smaller than the whims of its members.

We study the volatility of the policy chosen by a committee whose members have volatile preferences. It is smaller than if it was chosen by a single member, smaller the larger the size of the committee, and smaller the volatility of members' preferences.

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Year of publication:	2004
Authors:	Méon, Pierre-Guillaume
Institutions:	Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion (LaRGE), Institut de Finance de Strasbourg
Subject:	Committee \| majority voting \| uncertainty \| volatility

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers of LaRGE Research Center.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Classification:	D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005211990