Making Constitutions Work - Conditions for Maintaining the Rule of Law

There is growing evidence that economic freedom enhances economic growth. In order to safeguard economic freedom, integrating economic rights into the constitution almost seems to suggest itself. Constitutional rules, though, are not self-enforcing and thus suffer credibility problems. Many constitutional economists argue that the inadequacy of the constitutional document is a major reason for the unsatisfactory development of societies in terms of political stability and economic growth. In this paper, it is argued that there are extra-constitutional conditions on which the enforceability of constitutional provisions depend. Starting with the observation that many Latin American countries largely copied the U.S. Constitution but did not experience a similar development, three possible causes for the low enforcement of constitutions are analyzed: (1) the possible relevance of individual attitudes, (2) the possible relevance of organized interest groups, and (3) the possible relevance of "constitutional culture". With regard to the first possible cause, it is argued that if certain individual attitudes are absent, chances for enforcement of constitutions formally compatible with the rule of law are slim. With regard to the second possible cause, it is argued that chances that a rule of constitutional law will be enforced depend on the presence of a sufficiently large number of organized interest groups with sufficiently heterogeneous interests that command a considerable threat potential. A paradox thus evolves: interest groups are needed in order to maintain the rule of law; simultaneously, their existence threatens its maintenance to the degree to which they are successful in their rent seeking endeavors. With regard to the third possible cause, a distinction is made between two constitutional cultures, one in which the constitution is conceptualized as a "book of hopes" and another where it is seen as a legal document to be enforced