Making executive politics mutually productive and fair
Year of publication: |
2011
|
---|---|
Authors: | Durant, T. Clark |
Published in: |
Constitutional political economy. - Norwell, Mass. : Springer Science + Business Media, LLC, ISSN 1043-4062, ZDB-ID 1025732-9. - Vol. 22.2011, 2, p. 141-172
|
Subject: | Wahlsystem | Electoral system | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Regierungskoalition | Coalition government | Verteilungskonflikt | Distributional conflict | Theorie | Theory |
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