Management of fisheries in the EU : a principal-agent analysis
Year of publication: |
2001
|
---|---|
Authors: | Jensen, Frank ; Vestergaard, Niels |
Published in: |
Marine resource economics. - Chicago, Ill. : Univ. of Chicago Press, ISSN 0738-1360, ZDB-ID 879672-5. - Vol. 16.2001, 4, p. 277-291
|
Subject: | EU-Fischereipolitik | Common fisheries policy | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Fischerei | Fisheries | Steuer | Tax | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Theorie | Theory | EU-Staaten | EU countries |
-
Renewable resource management under asymmetric information : the fisheries case
Jensen, Frank, (2012)
-
Stochastic bycatch, innformational asymmetry, and discarding
Herrera, Guillermo E., (2005)
-
(2004)
- More ...
-
Moral Hazard Problems in Fisheries Regulation: The Case og Illegal Landings
Jensen, Frank, (2000)
-
Regulation of Renewable Resources in Federal Systems: The Case of Fishery in th EU
Jensen, Frank, (1999)
-
Fisheries Management with Multiple Market Failures
Jensen, Frank, (2004)
- More ...