Management Resistance to Takeover Bids and Shareholder Response.
This paper presents a model of management resistance to takeover bids in which there is both a manager-shareholder conflict of interest due to perquisite consumption and information asymmetry. The optimal response of shareholders to such resistance is then analyzed. The paper highlights the role of information asymmetry and perquisite consumption in explaining the empirical evidence on takeovers and the institutional features of golden parachutes and greenmail. Copyright 1992 by MIT Press.
Year of publication: |
1992
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Authors: | Sinha, Sidharth |
Published in: |
The Financial Review. - Eastern Finance Association - EFA. - Vol. 27.1992, 3, p. 375-90
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Publisher: |
Eastern Finance Association - EFA |
Saved in:
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