Managerial Career Concerns and Risk Management
We present a dynamic model of corporate risk management and managerial career concerns. We show that managers with low (high) initial reputation have high (low) career concerns about keeping their jobs and receiving all future income. These managers are more likely to speculate (hedge) early in their careers. In the later stage of their careers when managers have less career concerns, there is no speculative motive for self interested managers. On the other hand, highly reputable managers have minimal career concerns and they engage in neither hedging nor speculation early in their careers, but they may choose to hedge after poor early performance. Copyright (c) The Journal of Risk and Insurance, 2008.
Year of publication: |
2008
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Authors: | Nam, Jouahn ; Wang, Jun ; Zhang, Ge |
Published in: |
Journal of Risk & Insurance. - American Risk and Insurance Association - ARIA, ISSN 0022-4367. - Vol. 75.2008, 3, p. 785-809
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Publisher: |
American Risk and Insurance Association - ARIA |
Saved in:
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