Managerial compensation and firm value in the presence of socially responsible investors
Year of publication: |
May (II) 2018
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Authors: | Chaigneau, Pierre |
Published in: |
Journal of business ethics : JOBE. - Dordrecht : Springer, ISSN 0167-4544, ZDB-ID 868017-6. - Vol. 149.2018, 3, p. 747-768
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Subject: | Corporate social performance (CSP) | Corporate social responsibility (CSR) | Executive compensation | Fiduciary duty | Incentive contracts | Principal-agent model | Socially responsible investment (SRI) | Corporate Social Responsibility | Corporate social responsibility | Nachhaltige Kapitalanlage | Sustainable investment | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Führungskräfte | Managers | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Managervergütung | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Unternehmenswert | Firm value | Treuhänder | Fiduciary |
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