Managerial compensation and the cost of moral hazard
Year of publication: |
2000
|
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Authors: | Margiotta, Mary M. ; Miller, Robert Allen |
Published in: |
International economic review. - Hoboken, NJ : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 0020-6598, ZDB-ID 209871-4. - Vol. 41.2000, 3, p. 669-719
|
Subject: | Führungskräfte | Managers | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Anreiz | Incentives | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Theorie | Theory | USA | United States | 1948-1977 |
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