Managerial (In)attention to Competitive Threats
We integrate the Attention Based View of the firm and Regulatory Focus Theory to propose a model of managerial (in)attention that explains why appeals by middle managers for top managers to attend to specific threats of emerging rivals go unheeded. By acknowledging that different regulatory foci are elicited by different structural positions within the firm, we suggest that these differences in regulatory foci influence the allocation of attention to competitive intelligence warning of an emerging threat. We conclude by discussing how top managers might better evaluate whether threats of emerging rivals are worthy of deeper consideration. Copyright (c) Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2008.
Year of publication: |
2009
|
---|---|
Authors: | McMullen, Jeffery S. ; Shepherd, Dean A. ; Patzelt, Holger |
Published in: |
Journal of Management Studies. - Wiley Blackwell, ISSN 0022-2380. - Vol. 46.2009, 2, p. 157-181
|
Publisher: |
Wiley Blackwell |
Saved in:
freely available
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Managerial (in)attention to competitive threats
McMullen, Jeffery S., (2009)
-
Venture capitalists Ědecision policies across three countries : an institutional theory perspective
Zacharakis, Andrew L., (2007)
-
Confirmatory search as a useful heuristic? : testing the veracity of entrepreneurial conjectures
Shepherd, Dean A., (2012)
- More ...