Managerial incentives and the intraday timing of earnings announcements
The structure of United States security markets and information systems create incentives for managers to time strategically the release of accounting information when security markets are open or closed. This research tests two theories that offer predictions about when managers will release accounting earnings. The first theory, developed by Trueman (1991) predicts that managers choose the time of release to maximize security markets' reaction to good news, as determined by firms' economic earnings. The expectations adjustment hypothesis predicts managers choose the time of release based on the information environment facing the firm. The theory predicts that firms operating in environments marked by high degrees of information asymmetry will release earnings when security markets are closed.
Authors: | Pagach, Donald Patrick |
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Publisher: |
Florida State University Libraries |
Subject: | Commerce-Business | Business Administration | Accounting |
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