Managerial incentives in the presence of golden handshakes
Year of publication: |
February 2017
|
---|---|
Authors: | Jiang, Yi |
Published in: |
Finance research letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 1544-6123, ZDB-ID 2181386-3. - Vol. 20.2017, p. 177-183
|
Subject: | Severance pay | Pay-for-performance | Vega | Optimal executive compensation | Theorie | Theory | Führungskräfte | Managers | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Abfindung | Redundancy pay | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Lohn | Wages | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Anreiz | Incentives |
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