Managerial incentives, myopic loss aversion, and firm risk : a comparison of family and non-family firms
Year of publication: |
October 2018
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Authors: | Alessandri, Todd M. ; Mammen, Jan ; Eddleston, Kimberly |
Published in: |
Journal of business research : JBR. - New York, NY : Elsevier, ISSN 0148-2963, ZDB-ID 189773-1. - Vol. 91.2018, p. 19-27
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Subject: | Family firms | Managerial incentives | Myopic loss aversion | Risk preferences | Organizational downside risk | Familienunternehmen | Family business | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion | Führungskräfte | Managers | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Risikopräferenz | Risk attitude | Prospect Theory | Prospect theory | Risiko | Risk |
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