Managerial myopia and the mortgage meltdown
Year of publication: |
June 2018
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Authors: | Kolasinski, Adam C. ; Yang, Nan |
Published in: |
Journal of financial economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0304-405X, ZDB-ID 187118-3. - Vol. 128.2018, 3, p. 466-485
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Subject: | CEO incentives | CEO pay | Financial crisis | Financial fraud | Subprime mortgages | Finanzkrise | Führungskräfte | Managers | Subprime-Krise | Subprime financial crisis | Hypothek | Mortgage | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Betrug | Fraud |
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