Managerial Ownership, the Method of Payment for Acquisitions, and Executive Job Retention
This study investigates how acquiring and target firm managers' preferences for control rights motivate the payment for corporate acquisitions. We expect that managers of target firms who value influence in combined firms will prefer to receive stock. One reason top managers desire influence is to enhance their chances of retaining jobs in the combined firm. Our analysis shows a strong, positive association between managerial ownership of target firms and the likelihood of acquisitions for stock. We also find that managers of target firms are more likely to retain jobs in combined firms when they receive stock rather than cash. Copyright The American Finance Association 1998.
Year of publication: |
1998
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Authors: | Ghosh, Aloke ; Ruland, William |
Published in: |
Journal of Finance. - American Finance Association - AFA, ISSN 1540-6261. - Vol. 53.1998, 2, p. 785-798
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Publisher: |
American Finance Association - AFA |
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