Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation
Year of publication: |
2002-07
|
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Authors: | Bebchuk, Lucian ; Fried, Jesse M. ; Walker, David I. |
Institutions: | National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | CF LS LE published as Bebchuk, Lucian Arye, Jesse Fried and David Walker. “Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation." University of Chicago Law Review 69 (2002): 751-846. Number 9068 |
Classification: | D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; G32 - Financing Policy; Capital and Ownership Structure |
Source: |
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