Managerial preferences concerning risky projects
Year of publication: |
1993
|
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Authors: | Hermalin, Benjamin E. |
Published in: |
The journal of law, economics, & organization. - Cary, NC [u.a.] : Oxford Univ. Press, ISSN 8756-6222, ZDB-ID 634985-7. - Vol. 9.1993, 1, p. 127-135
|
Subject: | Führungskräfte | Managers | Risiko | Risk | Erwerbsverlauf | Occupational attainment | Eigentümerstruktur | Ownership structure | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Theorie | Theory |
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