Managerial Risk Aversion and the Structure of Executive Compensation
Year of publication: |
[2023]
|
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Authors: | Hrazdil, Karel ; Kim, Jeong Bon ; Novak, Jiri ; Zatzick, Christopher D. |
Publisher: |
[S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Führungskräfte | Managers | Theorie | Theory | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
Description of contents: | Abstract [papers.ssrn.com] |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | In: Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 31, No. 4, 563-581, 2023 Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments January 1, 2023 erstellt Volltext nicht verfügbar |
Classification: | J33 - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods ; G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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