Managerial short-termism, turnover policy, and the dynamics of incentives
Year of publication: |
September 2018
|
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Authors: | Varas, Felipe |
Published in: |
The review of financial studies. - Cary, NC : Oxford Univ. Press, ISSN 0893-9454, ZDB-ID 1043666-2. - Vol. 31.2018, 9, p. 3409-3451
|
Subject: | Führungskräfte | Managers | Dauer | Duration | Investition | Investment | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Investitionsentscheidung | Investment decision | Qualität | Quality | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Theorie | Theory |
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