Managing innovation : optimal incentive contracts for delegated R&D with double moral hazard
Joaquín Poblete, Daniel Spulber
| Year of publication: |
June 2017
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Poblete, Joaquín ; Spulber, Daniel F. |
| Published in: |
European economic review : EER. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0014-2921, ZDB-ID 207969-0. - Vol. 95.2017, p. 38-61
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| Subject: | R&D | Invention | Innovation | Contract | Principal | Agent | Incentives | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Innovationsmanagement | Innovation management | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Vertrag | Erfindung | Industrieforschung | Industrial research | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.03.004 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011812006