Mandatory Pensions and the Intensity of Adverse Selection in Life Insurance Markets

This article examines the impact of varying mandatory pensions on saving, life insurance, and annuity markets in an adverse selection economy. Under reasonable restrictions, we find unambiguous effects on market size, participation rates, and equilibrium prices. The degree of adverse selection, whether a market is active or inactive, and social welfare are analyzed. Copyright The Journal of Risk and Insurance.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2003
Authors:	Villeneuve, Bertrand
Published in:	Journal of Risk & Insurance. - American Risk and Insurance Association - ARIA, ISSN 0022-4367. - Vol. 70.2003, 3, p. 527-548
Publisher:	American Risk and Insurance Association - ARIA

freely available

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In libraries world-wide (WorldCat)

In German libraries (KVK)

subito order

I need help

More details

Extent:	text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005683365