Manipulability in school choice
Year of publication: |
2021
|
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Authors: | Decerf, Benoit ; Linden, Martin van der |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 197.2021, p. 1-36
|
Subject: | Boston mechanism | Deferred acceptance mechanism | Dominant strategy | Manipulability | Tie-breaking | Schulauswahl | School choice | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Manipulation | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Schule | School | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design |
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