Manipulation via capacities revisited
This paper revisits manipulation via capacities in centralized two-sided matching markets. Sönmez (1997) showed that no stable mechanism is non-manipulable via capacities. We show that non-manipulability via capacities can be equivalently described by two types of non-manipulation via capacities: non-Type-I-manipulability meaning that no college with vacant positions can manipulate by dropping some of its empty positions; and non-Type-II-manipulability meaning that no college with no vacant positions can manipulate by dropping some of its filled positions. Our main result shows that the student-optimal stable mechanism is the unique stable mechanism which is non-Type-I-manipulable via capacities and independent of truncations. Our characterization supports the use of the student-optimal stable mechanism in these matching markets because of its limited manipulability via capacities by colleges.
Year of publication: |
2010
|
---|---|
Authors: | Ehlers, Lars |
Published in: |
Games and Economic Behavior. - Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256. - Vol. 69.2010, 2, p. 302-311
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Subject: | Two-sided matching Stability Manipulation Capacities |
Saved in:
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