Manipulation via Endowments in a Market with Profit Maximizing Agents

In this paper we show that it is possible to manipulate market equilibria in an economy with profit maximizing agents (or agents with quasi-linear utility functions) by either destroying or withholding ones initial endowments.

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Year of publication:	2005-11-25
Authors:	Lahiri, Somdeb
Institutions:	EconWPA
Subject:	profit maximization \| market equilibrium \| manipulation via endowments

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Game Theory and Information.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Type of Document - pdf; pages: 14. 14 pages
Classification:	C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407610