Market Diffusion with Two-Sided Learning
We analyze the diffusion of a new product of uncertain value in a duopolistic market. Both sides of the market, buyers and sellers, learn the true value of the new product from experiments with it. Buyers have heterogeneous preferences over the products and sellers compete in prices. The pricing policies and market shares in the unique Markov-perfect equilibrium are obtained explicitly. The dynamics of the equilibrium market shares display excessive sales of the new product relative to the social optimum in early stages and too-low sales later on. The diffusion path of a successful product is S-shaped.
Year of publication: |
1997
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Authors: | Bergemann, Dirk ; Valimaki, Juuso |
Published in: |
RAND Journal of Economics. - The RAND Corporation, ISSN 0741-6261. - Vol. 28.1997, 4, p. 773-795
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Publisher: |
The RAND Corporation |
Saved in:
Online Resource
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