Market discipline in the governance of US bank holding companies : monitoring vs. influencing
Year of publication: |
2002
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Authors: | Bliss, Robert R. ; Flannery, Mark J. |
Published in: |
European finance review : the official journal of the European Finance Association. - Dordrecht [u.a.] : Kluwer Acad. Publ., ISSN 1382-6662, ZDB-ID 1338491-0. - Vol. 6.2002, 3, p. 361-395
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Subject: | Bankmanagement | Bank management | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Eigentümerstruktur | Ownership structure | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Bankenaufsicht | Banking supervision | Theorie | Theory | USA | United States |
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