Market Failure, Justice, and Preferences
In this brief discussion, I will address two main issues. The first concerns our understanding of the nature of market failure as an evaluative concept. I suggest that we have reason to avoid defining market failure solely in relation to the technical notion of Pareto optimality. The second issue concerns the authority of individual preferences in market contexts and the circumstances in which it might be appropriate to override preferences in order to address various kinds of (broadly defined) market failure. I draw some distinctions between different kinds of preferences that help us understand the ways in which individual preferences can assume authority. Against this background, we can better understand why the responsiveness of markets to preferences can be a virtue. However, I also identify ways in which individual preferences can lack authority and how, consequently, overriding preferences that might otherwise drive market activity can be justified.
Year of publication: |
2008
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Authors: | Macleod, Macleod , Colin M. |
Published in: |
Ethics and Economics. - CREUM, Université de Montréal. - Vol. 6.2008, 1, 10, p. 7-7
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Publisher: |
CREUM, Université de Montréal |
Subject: | market failure | justice |
Saved in:
freely available
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