MARKET NICHE, FLEXIBILITY AND COMMITMENT
We study a market-entry game in which the potential entrants wish to coordinate their actions (i.e. enter different market segments rather than compete directly). If (i) the firms have an option to wait, and (ii) each firm has a different reaction time after they have decided to wait, the unique outcome that survives the iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies favors the less flexible firms. Copyright © 2007 The Authors; Journal compilation © 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd and The University of Manchester.
Year of publication: |
2007
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Authors: | BASOV, SUREN ; SMIRNOV, VLADIMIR ; WAIT, ANDREW |
Published in: |
Manchester School. - School of Economics, ISSN 1463-6786. - Vol. 75.2007, 1, p. 122-130
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Publisher: |
School of Economics |
Saved in:
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