Market power in bilateral oligopoly markets with non-expandable infrastructures
Year of publication: |
2019
|
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Authors: | Funaki, Yukihiko ; Houba, Harold ; Motchenkova, Evgenia |
Publisher: |
Amsterdam and Rotterdam : Tinbergen Institute |
Subject: | Assignment Games | Infrastructure | Non-linear pricing | Market Power | Negotiations |
Series: | Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; TI 2019-070/VII |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 1677917725 [GVK] hdl:10419/205360 [Handle] RePEc:tin:wpaper:20190070 [RePEc] |
Classification: | D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance |
Source: |
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Market power in bilateral oligopoly markets with non-expandable infrastructures
Funaki, Yukihiko, (2019)
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Market Power in Bilateral Oligopoly Markets with Nonexpandable Infrastructures
Funaki, Yukihiko, (2012)
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Market power in bilateral oligopoly markets with nonexpandable infrastructures
Funaki, Yukihiko, (2012)
- More ...
-
Market Power in Bilateral Oligopoly Markets with Nonexpandable Infrastructures
Funaki, Yukihiko, (2012)
-
Market Power in Bilateral Oligopoly Markets with Nonexpandable Infrastructures
Funaki, Yukihiko, (2012)
-
Market Power in Bilateral Oligopoly Markets with Nonexpandable Infrastructures
Funaki, Yukihiko, (2012)
- More ...