Market Selection and Asymmetric Information
We consider a dynamic general equilibrium asset pricing model with heterogeneous agents and asymmetric information. We show how agents' different methods of gathering information affect their chances of survival in the market depending upon the nature of the information and the level of noise in the economy. Copyright 2003, Wiley-Blackwell.
Year of publication: |
2003
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Authors: | Mailath, George J. ; Sandroni, Alvaro |
Published in: |
Review of Economic Studies. - Oxford University Press. - Vol. 70.2003, 2, p. 343-368
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Publisher: |
Oxford University Press |
Saved in:
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