Marketing Agreement Impacts in an Experimental Market for Fed Cattle
Marketing agreements between meatpacking and cattle feeding firms have created concerns about their effects on fed cattle prices. Profit-sharing marketing agreements were imposed onto a simulated fed cattle market. Price level and variability differences with and without agreements, between agreement participants and nonparticipants, during agreement and nonagreement periods, and between participants receiving and not receiving a monetary incentive were evaluated. Prices and variability for nonagreement cattle were higher during the agreement periods. Marketing agreement participants realized lower, less variable prices than nonparticipating firms. Monetary incentives did not affect price levels but increased price variability. Copyright 1999, Oxford University Press.
Year of publication: |
1999
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Authors: | Koontz, Stephen R. |
Published in: |
American Journal of Agricultural Economics. - Agricultural and Applied Economics Association - AAEA. - Vol. 81.1999, 2, p. 347-358
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Publisher: |
Agricultural and Applied Economics Association - AAEA |
Saved in:
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