Markets for Influence

We specify an oligopoly game, where firms choose quantity in order to maximise profits, that is strategically equivalent to a standard Tullock rent-seeking game. We then show that the Tullock game may be interpreted as an oligopsonistic market for influence.Alternative specifications of the strategic variable give rise to a range of Nash equilibria with varying levels of rent dissipation

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Year of publication:	2007-07-15
Authors:	Menezes, Flavio ; Quiggin, John
Institutions:	School of Economics, University of Queensland
Subject:	Tullock contests \| oligopoly \| Marketing \| Risk and Uncertainty

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Risk and Sustainable Management Group Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series School of Economics>Risk and Sustainable Management Group Working Papers Number 151184
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010910940