Maskin-monotonic scoring rules
We characterize which scoring rules are Maskin-monotonic for each social choice problem as a function of the number of agents and the number of alternatives. We show that a scoring rule is Maskin-monotonic if and only if it satisfies a certain unanimity condition. Since scoring rules are neutral, Maskin-monotonicity turns out to be equivalent to Nash-implementability within the class of scoring rules. We propose a class of mechanisms such that each Nash-implementable scoring rule can be implemented via a mechanism in that class. Moreover, we investigate the class of generalized scoring rules and show that with a restriction on score vectors, our results for the standard case are still valid. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015
Year of publication: |
2015
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Authors: | Doğan, Battal ; Koray, Semih |
Published in: |
Social Choice and Welfare. - Springer. - Vol. 44.2015, 2, p. 423-432
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Publisher: |
Springer |
Saved in:
Online Resource
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